The indignity of ‘death with dignity’

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Never once am I to use an ordinary title when an extraordinary one will do as well! Besides, I mean to suggest that there is an additional insult besides death itself heaped upon the dying by our ordinary talk about “death with dignity.” Sometimes that is said even to be a human “right”; and what should a decent citizen do but insist on enjoying his rights? That might be his duty (if there is any such right), to the commonwealth, to the human race or some other collective entity; or at least, embracing that “right” and dying rationally would exhibit a proper respect for the going concept of a rational man. So “The Indignity of Death” would not suffice for my purposes, even though all I shall says depends on understanding the contradiction death poses to the unique worth of an individual human life.

The genesis of the following reflections may be worth noting. A few years ago, I embraced what I characterized as the oldest morality there is (no “new morality”) concerning responsibility toward the dying: the acceptance of death, stopping our medical interventions for all sorts of good, human reasons, only companying with the dying in their final passage. Then suddenly it appeared that altogether too many people were agreeing with me. That caused qualms. As a Southerner born addicted to lost causes, it seemed I now was caught up in a triumphal social trend. As a controversialist in ethics, I found agreement from too many sides. As a generally happy prophet of the doom facing the modern age, unless there is a sea-change in norms of action, it was clear from these premises that anything divers people agree to must necessarily be superficial if not wrong.

Today, when divers people draw the same warm blanket of “allowing to die” or “death with dignity” close up around their shoulders against the dread of that cold night, their various feet are showing. Exposed beneath our growing agreement to that “philosophy of death and dying” may be significantly different “philosophies of life”; and in the present age that agreement may reveal that these interpretations of human life are increasingly mundane, naturalistic, antihumanistic when measured by any genuinely “humanistic” esteem for the individual human being.

These “philosophical” ingredients of any view of death and dying I want to make prominent by speaking of “The Indignity of Death with Dignity.” Whatever practical

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agreement there may be, or "guidelines" proposed to govern contemporary choice or practice, these are bound to be dehumanizing unless at the same time we bring to bear great summit points and sources of insight in mankind's understanding of mankind (be it Christian or other religious humanism, or religiously-dependent but not explicitly religious humanism, or, if it is possible, a true humanism that is neither systematically nor historically dependent on any religious outlook).

**Death with Dignity Ideologies**

There is nobility and dignity in caring for the dying, but not in dying itself. "To be a therapist to a dying patient makes us aware of the uniqueness of each individual in this vast sea of humanity." It is more correct to say that a therapist brings to the event, from some other source, an awareness of the uniqueness, the once-for-allness of an individual life-span as part of an "outlook" and "on-look" upon the vast sea of humanity. In any case, that is the reflected glory and dignity of caring for the dying, that we or become aware of the unique life here ending. The humanity of such human caring is apt to be more sensitive and mature if we do not lightly suppose that it is an easy thing to convey dignity to the dying. That certainly cannot be done simply by withdrawing tubes and stopping respirators or not thumping hearts. At most, those omissions can only be prelude to companying with the dying in their final passage, if we are fortunate enough to share with them—they in moderate comfort—those interchanges that are in accord with the dignity and nobility of mankind. Still, however noble the manifestations of caring called for, however unique the individual life, we finally must come to the reality of death, and must ask, what can possibly be the meaning of "death with dignity"?

At most we convey only the liberty to die with human dignity; we can provide some of the necessary but not sufficient conditions. If the dying die with a degree of nobility it will be mostly their doing in doing their own dying. I fancy their task was easier when death as a human event meant that special note was taken of the last words of the dying—even humorous ones, as in the case of the Roman Emperor who said as he expired, "I Defy." A human countenance may be discerned in death accepted with serenity. So also there is a human countenance behind death with defiance. "Do not go gentle into that good night," wrote Dylan Thomas. "Old age should rage and burn against the close of day; Rage Rage against the dying of the light." But the human countenance has been removed from most modern understandings of death.

We do not begin to keep human community with the dying if we interpose between them and us most of the current notions of "death with dignity." Rather do we draw closer to them if and only if our conception of "dying with dignity" encompases—nakedly and without dilution—the final indignity of death itself, whether accepted or raged against. So I think it may be profitable to explore "the indignity of 'death with dignity'." "Good death" (euthanasia) like "Good grief!" are ultimately contradictions in terms, even if superficially, and before we reach the heart of the matter, there are distinctions to be made; even if, that is to say, the predicate "good" still is applicable in both cases in contrast to worse ways to die and worse ways to grieve or not to grieve.

"Death is simply a part of life," we are told, as a first move to persuade us to accept the ideology of the entire dignity of dying with dignity. A singularly unpersuasive proposition, since we are not told what sort of part of life death is. Disease, injury, congenital defects are also a part of life, and as well murder, rape, and pillage. Yet there is no campaign for accepting or doing those things with dignity. Nor, for that matter, for the contemporary mentality which would ensnare "death with dignity" is there an equal emphasis on "suffering with dignity," suffering as a "natural" part of life, etc. All those things, it seems, are enemies and violations of human nobility while death is not, or (with a few changes) need not be. Doctors did not invent the fact that death is an

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3 Schopenhauer's characterization of human history: if you've read one page, you've read it all.
enemy, although they may sometimes use disproportionate means to avoid final surrender. Neither did they invent the fact that pain and suffering are enemies and often indignities, although suffering accepted may also be ennobling or may manifest the nobility of the human spirit of any ordinary person.

But, then, it is said, death is an evolutionary necessity and in that further sense a part of life not to be denied. Socially and biologically, one generation follows another. So there must be death, else social history would have no room for creative novelty and planet earth would be glutted with humankind. True enough, no doubt, from the point of view of evolution (which—so far—never dies). But the man who is dying happens not to be evolution. He is a part of evolution, no doubt: but not to the whole extent of his being or his dying. A crucial testimony to the individual's transcendence over the species is man's problem and his dis-ease in dying. Death is a natural fact of life, yet no man dies "naturally," nor do we have occasions in which to practice doing so in order to learn how. Not unless the pursuit of philosophy is a practice of dying (as Plato's Phaedo teaches); and that I take to be an understanding of the human being we moderns do not mean to embrace when we embrace "death with dignity."

It is small consolation to tell mortal men that as long as you are, the death you contribute to evolution is not yet; and when death is, you are not—so why fear death? That is the modern equivalent to the recipe offered by the ancient Epicureans (and some Stoics) to undercut fear of death and devotion to the gods: as long as you are, death is not; when death is, you are not; there's never a direct encounter between you and death; so why dread death? Indeed, contrary to modern parlance, those ancient philosophers declared that death is not a part of life; so, why worry?

So "death is not a part of life" is another declaration designed to quiet fear of death. This can be better understood in terms of a terse comment by Wittgenstein: "Our life has no limit in just the way in which our visual field has no limit." We cannot see beyond the boundary of our visual field; it is more correct to say that beyond the boundary of our visual field we do not see. Not only so. Also, we do not see the boundary, the limit itself. There is no seeable bound to the visual field. Death is not a part of life in the same way that the boundary is not a part of our visual field. Commenting on this remark by Wittgenstein, James Van Evra writes: "Pressing the analogy, then, if my life has no end in just the way that my visual field has no limit, then it must be in the sense that I can have no experience of death, conceived as the complete cessation of experience and thought. That is, if life is considered to be a series of experiences and thoughts, then it is impossible for me to experience death, to experience something is to be alive, and hence is to be inside the bound formed by death." This is why death itself steadfastly resists conceptualization.

Still, I think the disanalogy ought also to be pressed, against both ancient and contemporary analytical philosophers. That notion of death as a limit makes use of a visual or spatial metaphor. Good basketball players are often men naturally endowed with an unusually wide visual field; this is true, for example, of Bill Bradley. Perhaps basketball players, among other things, strive to enlarge their visual fields, or their habitual use of what powers of sight they have, if that is possible. But ordinarily, everyone of us is perfectly happy within the unseeable limits of sight's reach.

Transfer this notion of death as a limit from space to time as the form of human perception, from sight to an individual's inward desire, effort and hope, and I suggest that one gets a different result. Then death as the temporal limit of a life-span is something we live toward. That limit still can never be experienced or conceptualized; indeed death is never a part of life. Moreover, neither is the boundary. Still it is a limit we conative human beings know we live up against during our life-spans. We do not live toward or up against the side-limits of our visual-span. Instead, within that acceptable visual limit (and other limits as well) as channels we live toward yet another limit which is death.

Nor is the following analogy for death as

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Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6.4311.

a limit of much help in deepening understanding. "... The importance of the limit and virtually all of its significance," writes Van Evra, "derives from the fact that the limit serves as an ordering device"—just as absolute zero serves for ordering a series; it is not just a limit, although nothing can exist at such a temperature. The analogy is valid so far as it suggests that we conceive of death not in itself but as it bears on us while still alive. As I shall suggest below, death teaches us to "number our days."

But that may not be its only ordering function for conative creatures. Having placed death "out of our league" by showing that it is not a "something," or never a part of life, and while understanding awareness of death as awareness of a limit bearing

upon us only while still alive, one ought not forthwith to conclude that this understanding of it "exoneraes death as the purported snake in our garden." Death as a limit can disorder no less than order the series. Only a disembodied reason can say, as Van Evra does, that "the bound, not being a member of the series, cannot defile it. The series is what it is, happy or unhappy, good or bad, quite independently of any bound as such." An Erik Erikson knows better than that when writing of the "despair and often unconscious fear of death" which results when "the one and only life cycle is not accepted as the ultimate life."

Despair, he observes, "expresses the feeling that the time is short, too short for the attempt to start another life and to try out alternate roads to integrity."6

It is the temporal flight of the series that is grievous (not death as an evil "something" within life's span to be balanced, optimistically or pessimistically, against other things that are good). The reminder that death is not a part of life, or that it is only a boundary never encountered, is an ancient recipe that can only increase the threat of death on any profound understanding of human life. The dread of death is the dread of oblivion, of there being only empty room in one's stead. Kubyler-Ross writes that for the dying, death means the loss of every loved one, total loss of everything that constituted the self in its world, separation from every experience, even from future possible, replacing experiences—nothingness beyond. Therefore, life is a time-intensive activity and not only a goods-intensive or quality-intensive activity. No matter how many "goods" we store up in barns, like the man in Jesus' parable we know that this night our soul may be required of us (Luke 12: 13-21). No matter what "quality of life" our lives have, we must take into account the opportunity-costs of used time. Death means the conquest of the time of our lives—even though we never experience the experience of the nothingness which is natural death.

"Awareness of dying" means awareness of that; and awareness of that constitutes an experience of ultimate indignity in and to the awareness of the self who is dying.

We are often reminded of Koheleth's litany: "For everything there is a season, and a time for every matter under heaven: a time to be born and a time to die; a time to plant, and a time to pluck up what is planted," etc. (Eccles. 3:1,2). Across those words of the narrator of Ecclesiastes the view gains entrance that only an "untimely" death should be regretted or mourned. Yet we know better how to specify an untimely death than to define or describe a "timely" one. The author of Genesis tells us that, at 180 years of age, the patriarch Isaac

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“breathed his last; and he died and was
gathered to his people, old and full of
years…” (Gen. 35:29). Even in face of
sacred Scripture, we are permitted to
wonder what Isaac thought about it; whether
he too knew how to apply the category
“fullness of years” to himself and agreed his
death was nothing but timely.

We do Koheleth one better and say that
death cannot only be timely; it may also be
“beautiful.” Whether such an opinion is to
be ascribed to David Hendin or not (a
“fact of life” man he surely is, who also
unambiguously subtitled his chapter on eu-
thanasia “Let There Be Death”), that opin-
ion seems to be the outlook of the legislator
and physician, Walter Sackett, Jr., who pro-
posed the Florida “Death with Dignity”
Statute. All his mature life his philosophy
has been, “Death, like birth, is glorious—
let it come easy.” Such was by no means
Koheleth’s opinion when he wrote (and
wrote beautifully) about a time to be born
and a time to die. Dr. Sackett also suggests
that up to 90 percent of the 1,800 patients
in state hospitals for the mentally retarded
should be allowed to die. Five billion dol-
ars could be saved in the next half century
if the state’s mongoloids were permitted to
succumb to pneumonia, a disease to which
they are highly susceptible. I suggest that
the physician in Dr. Sackett has atrophied.
He has become a public functionary, treat-
ing taxpayers’ pocketbooks under the gen-
eral anesthesia of a continuous daytime
soap opera entitled “Death Can Be Beautiful!”

Death for an older person should be a
beautiful event. There is beauty in birth,
growth, fullness of life and then, equally so,
in the tapering off and final end. There are
analogies all about us. What is more beauti-
ful than the spring budding of small leaves;
then the fully-leaved tree in summer; and
then in the beautiful brightly colored au-
tumn leaves gliding gracefully to the
ground? So it is with humans.” Those are
words from a study document on Eutha-
nasia drafted by the Council for Christian
Social Action of the United Church of

Christ in 1972. An astonishing footnote at
this point states that “the naturalness of
dying” is suggested in funeral services when
the minister says “God has called” the
deceased, or says he has “gone to his re-
ward,” recites the “dust to dust” passage, or
notes that the deceased led a full life or ran
a full course!

Before that statement was adopted by
that Council on Feb. 17, 1973, more or-
thodox wording was inserted: “Transfor-
mation from life on earth to life in the here-
after of the Lord is a fulfillment. The ac-
ceptance of death is our witness to faith in
the resurrection of Jesus Christ (Rom. 8).
We can rejoice.” The subdued words “we
can rejoice” indicate a conviction that some-
thing has been subdued. The words “accep-
tance of death” takes the whole matter out
of the context of romantic naturalism and
sets it in a proper religious context—based
on the particular Christian tenet that death
is a conquered enemy, to be accepted in
the name of its Conqueror. More than a
relic of the nature mysticism that was so
luxurient in the original paragraph, how-
ever, remains in the words, “Death for an
older person should be a beautiful event.
There is beauty in birth, growth, fullness of
life and then, equally so, in the tapering off
and final end.” (Italics added.) I know no
Christian teaching that assures us that our
“final end” is “equally” beautiful as birth,
growth and fullness of life. Moreover, if
revelation disclosed any such thing it would
be contrary to reason and to the human
reality and experience of death. The views
of our “pre-death morticians” are simply
discordant with the experienced reality they
attempt to beautify. So, in her recent book,
Marya Mannes writes “the name of the
oratorio is euthanasia.” And her statement
“dying is merely suspension within a mys-
tery,” seems calculated to induce vertigo in
face of a fascinating abyss in prospect.

No exception can be taken to one line
in the letter people are being encouraged to
write and sign by the Euthanasia Societies
of Great Britain and America. That line
states: “I do not fear death as much as I
fear the indignity of deterioration, depend-
ence and hopeless pain.” Such an exercise
in analyzing comparative indignities should be given approval. But in the preceding sentence the letter states: "Death is as much a reality as birth, growth, maturity, and old age—*it* is the one certainty." That logically leaves open the question what sort of "reality," what sort of "certainty," *death* is. But by placing death on a parity with birth, growth, maturity—and old age in many of its aspects—the letter beautifies death by association. To be written long before death when one is thinking "generally" (i.e., "rationally") about the topic, the letter tempts us to suppose that men can think generally about their own deaths. Hendin observes in another connection that "there is barely any relation between what people think that they think about death and the way they actually feel about it when it must be faced." Then it may be that "the heart has its reasons that reason cannot know" (Pascal)—beforehand—and among those "reasons," I suggest, will be an apprehension of the ultimate (noncomparative) indignity of death. Talk about death as a fact or a reality seasonally recurring in life with birth or planting, maturity and growth, may after all not be very rational. It smacks more of whistling before the darkness descends, and an attempt to brainwash one's contemporaries to accept a very feeble philosophy of life and death.

Birth and death (our *terminus ad quo* and our *terminus ad quem*) are not to be equated with any of the qualities or experiences, the grandeur and the misery, in between, which constitutes "parts" of our lives. While we live toward death and can encompass our own dying in awareness, no one in the same way is aware of his own birth. We know that we were born in the same way we know *that* we die. Explanations of whence we came do not establish conscious contact with our individual origin; and among explanations, that God called us from the womb out of nothing is as good as any other; and better than most. But awareness of dying is quite another matter. That we may have, but not awareness of our births. And while awareness of birth might conceivably be the great original individuating experience (if we had it), among the race of men it is awareness of dying that is uniquely individuating. To encompass one's own death in the living and dying of one's life is more of a task than it is a part of life. And there is something of indignity to be faced when engaging in that final act of life. Members of the caring human community (doctors, nurses, family) are apt to keep closer company with the dying if we acknowledge the loss of all worth by the loss of him in whom inhered all worth in his world. Yet ordinary men may sometimes nobly suffer the ignobility of death.

By way of contrast with the "A Living Will" framed by the Euthanasia Society, the Judicial Council of the AMA in its recent action on the physician and the dying patient had before it two similar letters. One was composed by the Connecticut Delegation:

**To my Family, my Physician**

**my Clergyman, my Lawyer—**

If the time comes when I can no longer actively take part in decisions for my own future, I wish this statement to stand as the testament of my wishes. If there is no reasonable expectation of my recovery from physical or mental and spiritual disability, I, ........................., request that I be allowed to die and not be kept alive by artificial means or heroic measures. I ask also that drugs be mercifully administered to me for terminal suffering even if in relieving pain they may hasten the moment of death. I value life and the dignity of life, so that I am not asking that my life be directly taken, but that my dying not be unreasonably prolonged nor the dignity of life be destroyed. This request is made, after careful reflection, while I am in good health and spirits. Although this document is not legally binding, you who care for me will, I hope, feel morally bound to take it into account. I recognize that it places a heavy burden of responsibility upon you, and it is with the intention of sharing this responsibility that this statement is made.

A second letter had been composed by a physician to express his own wishes, in quite simple language:

**To my Family, To my Physician—**

Should the occasion arise in my lifetime when death is imminent and a decision is to

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11Hendin, *Death as a Fact of Life*, p. 103.
be made about the nature and the extent of the care to be given to me and I am not able at that time to express my desires, let this statement serve to express my deep, sincere, and considered wish and hope that my physician will administer to me simple, ordinary medical treatment. I ask that he not administer heroic, extraordinary, expensive, or useless medical care or treatment which in the final analysis will merely delay, not change, the ultimate outcome of my terminal condition.

A comparison of these declarations with "A Living Will" circulated by the Euthanasia Society reveals the following signal differences: neither of the AMA submissions engages in any superfluous calculus of "comparative indignities"; neither associates the reality of death with such things as birth or maturation; both allow death to be simply what it is in human experience; both are in a general sense "pro-life" statements, in that death is neither reified as one fact among others nor beautified even comparatively. Everyone concerned takes the wrong turn in trying either to "thing-ify" death or to beautify it. The dying have at least this advantage, that in these projects for dehumanizing death by naturalizing it the dying finally cannot succeed, and death makes its threatening visage known to them before ever there are any societal or evolutionary replacement values or the everlasting arms or Abraham's bosom to rest on. Death means finis, not in itself telos. Certainly not a telos to be engineered, or to be accomplished by reducing both human life and death to the level of natural events.

"Thing-ifying" death reaches its highest pitch in the stated preference of many people in the present age for sudden death, for death from unanticipated internal collapse, from the abrupt intrusion of violent outside forces, from some chance occurrence due to the natural law governing the operation of automobiles. While for a comparative calculus of indignities sudden unknowing death may be preferred to suffering knowingly or unknowingly the indignity of deterioration, abject dependence, and hopeless pain, how ought we to assess in human

12What, after all, is the point of promoting, as if it were a line of reasoning, observations such as that said to be inscribed on W. C. Field's tombstone: "On the whole I'd rather be here than in Philadelphia"?

13I may add that while the House of Delegates did not endorse any particular form to express an individual's wishes relating prospectively to his final illness, it recognized that individuals have a right to express them. While it encouraged physicians to discuss such matters with patients and attend to their wishes, the House nevertheless maintained a place for the conscience and judgment of a physician in determining indicated treatment. It did not subsume every consideration under the rubric of the patient's right to refuse treatment (or to have refused treatment). That sole action-guide can find no medical or logical reason for distinguishing, in physician actions, between the dying and those who simply have a terminal illness (or have this "dying life," Augustine's description of all of us). It would also entail a belief that wishing or autonomous choice makes the moral difference between life and death decisions which then are to be imposed on the physician-technician; and that, to say the least, is an ethics that can find no place for either reason or sensibility.

terms the present-day absolute (noncomparative) preference for sudden death? Nothing reveals more the meaning we assign to human “dignity” than the view that sudden death, death as an eruptive natural event, could be a prismatic case of death with dignity or at least one without indignity. Human society seems about to rise to the moral level of the “humane” societies in their treatment of animals. What is the principled difference between their view and ours about the meaning of dying “humanely”? By way of contrast, consider the prayer in the Anglican prayer book: “From perils by night and perils by day, perils by land and perils by sea, and from sudden death, Lord, deliver us.” Such a petition bespeaks an age in which dying with dignity was a gift and a task (Gaube und Auf-gaube), a liberty to encompass dying as a final act among the actions of life, to unfold awareness of dying as an ingredient into awareness of one’s self dying as the finale of the self’s relationships in this life to God or to fellowman—in any case to everything that was worthy.

Man Knows that He Dies

Before letting Koheleth’s “a time to be born and a time to die” creep as a gloss into our texts, perhaps we ought to pay more attention to the outlook on life and death expressed in the enchantment and frail beauty of those words,15 and ask whether that philosophy can possibly be a proper foundation for the practice of medicine or for the exercise of the most sensitive care for the dying.

That litany on the times for every matter under heaven concludes with the words, “What gain has the worker from his toil?” (Eccles. 3:9). In general, the author of Ecclesiastes voices an unrelieved pessimism. He has “seen everything that is done under the sun,” in season and out of season. It is altogether “an unhappy business that God has given to the sons of men to be busy with”—this birthing and dying, planting and uprooting; “all is vanity and seeking after wind” (Eccles. 1:3b, 14). So, he writes with words of strongest revulsion, “I hated life, because what is done under the sun was grievous to me”; “I hated all my toil and gave myself up to despair...” (Eccles. 2:17, 18a, 20).

After that comes the litany “for everything there is a season”—proving, as Kierkegaard said, that a poet is a man whose heart is full of pain but whose lips are so formed that when he gives utterance to that pain he makes beautiful sounds. Koheleth knew, as later did Nietzsche, that the eternal recurrence of birth and death and all things else was simply “the spirit of melancholy” unrelieved, even though there is nothing else to believe since God died.16 (The Pope knows: he was at the bedside.)

“Death with dignity” because death is a “part” of life, one only of its seasonal realities? If so, then the acceptable death of all flesh means death with the same signal indignity that brackets the whole of life and its striving. Dying is worth as much as the rest; it is no more fruitless.

“For the fate of the sons of men and the fate of the beasts is the same; as one dies so dies the other. They all have the same breath, and man has no advantage over the beasts; for all is vanity” (Eccles. 3:19).

“Death with dignity” or death a part of life based on an equilibration of the death of a man with the death of a dog? I think that is not a concept to be chosen as the foundation of modern medicine, even though both dogs and men are enabled to die “humanely.”

15In the whole literature on death and dying, there is no more misquoted sentence, or statement taken out of context, than Koheleth’s “time to be born and a time to die”—unless it be “Nor strive officiously to keep alive.” The latter line is from an ironic poem by the nineteenth century poet Arthur Hugh Clough, entitled “The Latest Decalogue”:

“Thou shalt not kill; but need’st not strive
 officiously to keep alive.
 Do not adultery commit;
 Advantage rarely comes of it:
 Thou shalt not steal; an empty feat,
 When it’s so lucrative to cheat:
 Bear not false witness; let the lie
 Have time on its own wings to fly:
 Thou shalt not covet; but tradition
 Approves all forms of competition.
 The sum of all is, thou shalt love
 If anybody, God above:
 At any rate, shalt never labor
 More than thyself to love thy neighbor.”

16Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, especially XLVI and LXVI.
Or to go deeper still: "death with dignity" because the dead are better off than the living? "I thought the dead who are already dead," Koheleth writes in unrelieved sorrow over existence, "more fortunate than the living who are still alive; and better than both is he who has not yet been, and has not seen the evil deeds that are done under the sun" (Eccles. 4:2,3). Thus the book of Ecclesiastes is the source of the famous interchange between two pessimistic philosophers, each trying to exceed the other in gloom: First philosopher: More blessed are the dead than the living. Second philosopher: Yes, what you say is true; but more blessed still are those who have never been born. First philosopher: Yes, wretched life; but few there be who attain to that condition!

But Koheleth thinks he knows some who have attained to the blessed goal of disenchantment from the cycles in which there is a time for every matter under heaven.

"...An untimely birth [a miscarriage] is better off [than a living man], for it [a miscarriage] comes into vanity and goes into darkness, and in darkness its name is covered, moreover it has not seen the sun or known anything; yet it finds rest rather than he [the living]" (Eccles. 6:3b, 4,5). So we might say that death can have its cosmic dignity if untormented by officious physicians, because the dying go to the darkness, to Limbo where nameless miscarriages dwell, having never seen the sun or known anything. Thus, if dying with dignity as a part of life's natural, undulating seasons seems not to be a thought with much consolation in it (being roughly equivalent to the indignity besetting everything men do and every other natural time), still the dying may find rest as part of cosmic order, from which, once upon a time, the race of men arose to do the unhappy business God has given them to be busy with, and to which peaceful darkness the dying return.

Hardly a conception that explains the rise of Western medicine, the energy of its care of the dying, or its war against the indignity of suffering and death—or a conception on which to base its reformation! Dylan Thomas' words were directed against such notions: "The wise men at their end know dark is right,/Because their words had forked no lightning."

There is finally in Ecclesiastes, however, a deeper strand than those which locate men living and dying as simply parts of some malignly or benignly neglectful natural or cosmic order. From these more surface outlooks, the unambiguous injunction follows: Be a part; let there be death—in its time and place, of course (whatever that means). Expressing a deeper strand, however, Koheleth seems to say: Let the natural or cosmic order be whatever it is; men are different. His practical advice is: Be what you are, in human awareness apart and not a part. Within this deeper understanding of the transcendent, threatened nobility of a human life, the uniqueness of the individual human subject, there is ground for awareness of death as an indignity yet freedom to encompass it with dignity.

Now it is that Koheleth reverses the previous judgments he decreed over all he had seen under the sun. Before, the vale of the sunless not-knowing of a miscarriage having its name covered by darkness seemed preferable to living; and all man's works a seeking after wind. So, of course, there was "a time for dying." But now Koheleth writes, "...there is no work or thought or knowledge or wisdom in Sheol, to which you are going" (Eccles. 9:10b). While the fate of the sons of men and the fate of the beasts are the same, still "a living dog is better than a dead lion"; and to be a living man is better than either, because of what Koheleth means by "living." "He who is joined with all the living has hope" (Eccles. 9:4), and that is hardly a way to describe dogs or lions. Koheleth, however, identifies the grandeur of man not so much with hope as with awareness, even awareness of dying, and the misery of man with the indignity of dying of which he, in his nobility, is aware. "For the living know that they will die," he writes, "but the dead know nothing..." (Eccles. 9:5). Before, the dead or those who never lived had superiority; now, it is the living who are superior precisely by virtue of their awareness of dying and of its indignity to the knowing human spirit.

Therefore, I suggest that Koheleth probed the human condition to a depth to which more than twenty centuries later Blaise Pascal came. "Man is but a reed, the feeblest in nature, but he is a thinking reed... A vapour, a drop of water, is sufficient to slay
him. But were the universe to crush him, man would still be nobler than that which kills him, for he knows that he dies, while the universe knows nothing of the advantage it has over him. Thus our whole dignity consists in thought.”17 (Italics added.)

So the grandeur and misery of man are fused together in the human reality and experience of death. To deny the indignity of death requires that the dignity of man be refused also. The more acceptable in itself death is, the less the worth or uniqueness ascribed to the dying life.

True Humanism and the Dread of Death

I always write as the ethicist I am, namely, a Christian ethicist, and not as some hypothetical common denominator. On common concrete problems I, of course, try to elaborate analysis at the point or on a terrain where there may be convergence of vectors that began in other ethical outlooks and onlooks. Still one should not pant for agreement as the Hartford pests for the waterbrooks, lest the substance of one's ethics dissolve into vapidity. So in this section I want, among other things, to exhibit some of the meaning of “Christian humanism” in regard to death and dying, in the confidence that this will prove tolerable to my colleagues for a time, if not finally instructive to them.

In this connection, there are two counterpoised verses in the First Epistle of St. John that are worth pondering. The first reads: “Perfect love casts out fear” (which being interpreted means: Perfect care of the dying casts out fear of one's own death or rejection of their dying because of fear of ours). The second verse reads: “Where fear is, love is not perfected” (which being interpreted means: Where fear of death and dying remains, medical and human care of the dying is not perfected). That states nothing so much as the enduring dubiety and ambiguity of any mortal man's care of another through his dying. At the same time there is here applied without modification a standard for unflinching care of a dying fellowman, or short of that of any fellow mortal any time. That standard is cut to the measure of the perfection in benevolence believed to be that of our Father in Heaven in his dealings with mankind. So there is “faith-ing” in an ultimate righteousness beyond the perceptible human condition presupposed by those verses that immediately have to do simply with loving and caring.

Whatever non-Christians may think about the theology here entailed, or about similar foundations in any religious ethics, I ask that the notation upon or penetration of the human condition be attended to. Where and insofar as fear is, love and care for the dying cannot be perfected in moral agents or the helping professions. The religious traditions have one way of addressing that problematic. In the modern age the problematic itself is avoided by various forms and degrees of denial of the tragedy of death which proceeds first to reduce the unique worth and once-for-all-ness of the individual life-span that dies.

Perhaps one can apprehend the threat posed to the dignity of man (i.e. in an easy and ready dignifying of death) by many modern viewpoints, especially those dominating the scientific community, and their superficial equivalents in our culture gen-

17Pascal, Pensées, p. 347.
erally, by bringing into view three states of consciousness in the Western past.

The burden of the Hebrew Scriptures was man’s obedience or disobedience to covenant, to Torah. Thus sin was the problem, and death came in only as a subordinate theme; and, as one focus for the problematic of the human condition, this was a late development. In contrast, righteousness and disobedience (sin) was a subordinate theme in Greek religion. The central theme of Greek religious thought and practice was the problem of death—a problem whose solution was found either by initiation into religious cults that promised to extricate the soul from its corruptible shroud or by belief in the native power of the soul to outlast any number of bodies. Alongside these, death was at the heart of the pathos of life depicted in Greek tragic drama, against which, and against the flaws of finitude in general, the major character manifested his heroic transcendence. So sin was determinative for the Hebrew consciousness; death for the Greek consciousness.

Consciousness III was Christianity, and by this, sin and death were tied together in Western man’s awareness of personal existence. These two foci of man’s misery and of his need for redemption—sin and death—were inseparably fused. This new dimension of man’s awareness of himself was originally probed most profoundly by St. Paul’s Letter to the Romans (5-7). Those opaque reflections, I opine, were once understood not so much by the intellect as along the pulses of ordinary people in great numbers, in taverns and market places; and it represents a cultural breakdown without parallel that these reflections are scarcely understandable to the greatest intelligences today. A simple night school lesson in them may be gained by simply pondering a while the two verses quoted above from St. John’s Epistle.

The point is that according to the Christian saga the Messiah did not come to bring boors into culture. Nor did he bear epileptic or psychosomatic disorders to gain victory over them in the flesh before the interventions of psychoneurosurgery. Rather is he said to have been born mortal flesh to gain for us a foretaste of victory over sin and death where those twin enemies had taken up apparently secure citadel.

Again, the point for our purposes is not to be drawn into agreement or disagreement with those theological affirmations, and it is certainly not to be tempted into endless speculation about an after-life. Crucial instead is to attend to the notion on the human condition implied in all that. Death is an enemy even if it is the last enemy to be fully conquered in the Fulfillment, the eschaton; meanwhile, the sting of death is sin. Such was the new consciousness-raising that Christianity brought into the Western world. And the question is whether in doing so it has not grasped some important experiential human realities better than most philosophies, whether it was not attuned to essential ingredients of the human condition vis-a-vis death—whatever the truth or falsity of its theological address to that condition.

The foregoing, I grant, may be an oversimplification; and I am aware of needed corrections more in the case of Hebrew humanism than in the case of Greek humanism. The New Testament word, “He will wipe away every tear from their eyes, and death shall be no more, neither shall there be mourning nor crying nor pain any more, for the former things have passed away,” (Rev. 21:3,4) has its parallel in the Hebrew Bible: “He will swallow up death forever, and the Lord God will wipe away tears from all faces…” (Isa. 25:8). Again, since contemplating the Lord God may be too much for us, I ask only that we attend to the doctrine of death implied in these passages: it is an enemy, surely, and not simply an acceptable part of the natural order of things. And the connection between dread of death and sin, made most prominent in Christian consciousness, was nowhere better stated than in Ecclesiastes: “This is the root of the evil in all that happens under the sun, that one fate comes to all. Therefore, men’s minds are filled with evil and there is madness in their hearts while they live, for they know that afterward—they are off to the dead!”

One can, indeed, ponder that verse about the source of all evil in the apprehended evil of death together with another verse in Ecclesiastes which reads: “Teach us so to number our days that we may apply our hearts unto wisdom.” The first says that death is an evil evil: it is experienced as a threatening limit that begets evil. The sec-
ond says that death is a good evil: that experience also begets good. Without death, and death perceived as a threat, we would also have no reason to “number our days” so as to ransom the time allotted us, to receive life as a precious gift, to drink the wine of gladness in toast to every successive present moment. Instead, life would be an endless boredom and boring because end-

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ome there are who number their days so as to apply their hearts unto eating, drinking, and being merry—for tomorrow we die. Some there are who number their days so as to apply their hearts unto wisdom—for tomorrow we die. Both are life-spans enhanced in importance and individuation under the stimulus of the perceived evil of death.

less; there would be no reason to probe its depths while there is still time. Some there are who number their days so as to apply their hearts unto eating, drinking and being merry—for tomorrow we die. Some there are who number their days so as to apply their hearts unto wisdom—for tomorrow we die. Both are life-spans enhanced in importance and in individuation under the stimulus of the perceived evil of death. Knowledge of human good or of human evil that is in the slightest degree above the level of the beasts of the field are both enhanced because of death, the horizon of human existence. So, debarment from access to the tree of life was on the horizon and a sequence of the events in the Garden of Paradise; the temptation in eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil was because that seemed a way for mortal creatures to become like gods. The punishment of that is said to have been death; and no governor uses as a penalty something that anyone can simply choose to believe to be a good or simply receive as a neutral or dignified, even ennobling, part of life. So I say death may be a good evil or an evil evil, but it is perceived as an evil or experienced indignity in either case. Existential anxiety or general anxiety (distinguishable from particular fears or removable anxieties) means anxiety over death toward which we live. That paradoxically, as Reinhold Niebuhr said, is the source of all human creativity and of all human sinfulness.

Of course, the sages of old could and did engage in a calculus of comparative indignities. “O death, your sentence is welcome,” wrote Ben Sira, “to a man worn out with age, worried about everything, disaffected and beyond endurance” (Ecclus. 41:2,3). Still death was a “sentence,” not a natural event acceptable in itself. Moreover, not every man grows old gracefully in the Psalms; instead, one complains:

Take pity on me, Yahweh, I am in trouble now. Grief wastes away my eye, My throat, my inmost parts. For my life is worn out with sorrow, My years with sighs; My strength yields under misery, My bones are wasting away. To every one of my oppressors I am contemptible, Loathsome to my neighbors, To my friends a thing of fear. Those who see me in the street Hurry past me. I am forgotten, as good as dead, in their hearts, Something discarded. (Ps. 31:9-12)

What else is to be expected if it be true that the madness in men’s hearts while they live, and the root of all evil in all that happens under the sun, lies in the simple fact that every man consciously lives toward his own death, knowing that afterward he too is off to the dead? Where fear is—fear of the properly dreadful—love and care for the dying cannot be perfected.

Unless one has some grounds for respecting the shadow of death upon every human countenance—grounds more ultimate than perceptible realities—then it makes good sense as a policy of life simply to try to out-
last one's neighbors. One can, for example, generalize, and so attenuate our neighbors' irreplaceability. "If I must grieve whenever the bell tolls," writes Carey McWilliams, "I am never bereft; some of my kinsmen will remain. Indeed, I need not grieve much—even, lest I suggest some preference among my brethren, should not grieve much—for each loss is small compared to what remains." But that solace, we know, is denied the dead who have lost everything making for worth in this their world. Realistic love for another irrereplaceable, non-interchangeable individual human being means, as Unamuno wrote, care for another "doomed soul."

In this setting, let us now bring into consideration some empirical findings that in this day are commonly supposed to be more confirmatory than wisdom meditated from the heart.

In the second year anatomy course, medical students clothe with "gallows humor" their encounter with the cadaver which once was a human being alive. That defense is not to be despised; nor does it necessarily indicate socialization in shallowness on the students' part. Even when dealing with the remains of the long since dead, there is special tension involved—if I mistook not a recent address by Renée Fox—when performing investigatory medical actions involving the face, the hands, and the genitalia. This thing-in-the-world that was once a man alive we still encounter as once a communicating being, not quite as an object of research or instruction. Face and hands, yes; but why the genitalia? Those reactions must seem incongruous to a resolutely biologizing age. For a beginning of an explanation, one might take up the expression "carnal knowledge"—which was the best thing about the movie bearing that title—and behind that go to the expression "carnal conversation," an old, legal term for adultery, and back of both to the Biblical word "knew" in "And Adam knew his wife and begat. . . ." Here we have an entire anthropology impacted in a word, not a squeamish euphemism. In short, in those reactions of medical students can be discerned a sensed relic of the human being bodily experiencing and communicating, and the body itself uniquely speaking.

Notably, however, there's no "gallows humor" used when doing or observing one's first autopsy, or in the emergency room when a D.O.A. (Dead on Arrival) is brought in with his skull cleaved open. With regard to the "newly dead" we come as close as we possibly can to experiencing the incommensurable contrast between life and death. Yet those sequential realities—life and death—here juxtaposed never meet in direct encounter. So we never have an impression or experience of the measure and meaning of the two different worlds before which we stand in the autopsy and the emergency room. A cadaver has over time become almost a thing-in-the-world from which to gain knowledge of the human body. While there a little humor helps, to go about acquiring medical knowledge from autopsies requires a different sort of inward effort to face down or live with our near-experience of the boundary of life and death. The cleavage in the brain may be quite enough and more than enough to explain rationally why this man was D.O.A. But, I suggest, there can be no gash deep enough, no physical event destructive enough to account for the felt difference between life and death that we face here. The physician or medical student may be a confirmed materialist. For him the material explanation of this death may be quite sufficient rationally. Still the heart has its reasons that the reason knows not of; and, I suggest, the awakening of these feelings of awe and dread should not be repressed in anyone whose calling is to the human dignity of caring for the dying.

In any case, from these empirical observations, if they be true, let us return to a great example of theological anthropology in order to try to comprehend why death was thought to be the assault of an enemy. According to some readings, Christians in all ages should be going about bestowing the gift of immortality on one another posthaste. A distinguished Catholic physician, beset by what he regarded as the incorrigible problems of medical ethics today, once shook his head in my presence and wondered out loud why the people who most believe in an after-life should have established so many hospitals! That seems to require explanation, at least as against silly

interpretations of “otherworldliness.” The answer is that none of the facts or outlooks cited ever denied the reality of death, or affirmed that death ever presents a friendly face (except comparatively). The explanation lies in the vicinity of Christian anthropology and the Biblical view that death is an enemy. That foundation of Western medicine ought not lightly to be discarded, even if we need to enliven again the sense that there are limits to man’s struggle against that alien power.

Far from the otherworldliness or body-soul dualism with which he is often charged, St. Augustine went so far as to say that “the body is not an extraneous ornament or aid, but a part of man’s very nature.”19 Upon that understanding of the human being, Augustine could then express a quite realistic account of “the dying process”:

Wherefore, as regards bodily death, that is, the separation of the soul from the body, it is good to none while it is being endured by those whom we say are in the article of death [dying]. For the very violence with which the body and soul are wrenched asunder, which in the living are conjoined and closely intertwined, brings with it a harsh experience, jarring horribly on nature as long as it continues, till there comes a total loss of sensation, which arose from the very interpenetration of flesh and spirit.20

From this Augustine correctly concludes: “Wherefore death is indeed ... good to none while it is actually suffered, and while it is subduing the dying to its power. ...” His ultimate justifications attenuate not at all the harshness of that alien power’s triumph. Death, he only says, is “meritoriously endured for the sake of winning what is good. And regarding what happens after death, it is no absurdity to say that death is good to the good, and evil to the evil.”21 But that is not to say that death as endured in this life, or as life’s terminus, is itself in any way good. He even goes so far as to say:

For though there can be no manner of doubt that the souls of the just and holy lead lives in peaceful rest, yet so much better would it be for them to be alive in healthy, well-conditioned bodies, that even those who hold the tenet that it is most blessed to be quit of every kind of body, condemn this opinion in spite of themselves.22

Thus, for Biblical or later Christian anthropology, the only possible form which human life in any true and proper sense can take here or hereafter is “somatic.” That is the Pauline word; we today say “psychosomatic.” Therefore, for Christian theology death may be a “conquered enemy”; still it was in the natural order—and as long as the generations of mankind endure will remain—an enemy still. To pretend otherwise adds insult to injury—or, at least, carelessness.

There are two ways, so far as I can see, to reduce the dreadful visage of death to a level of inherently acceptable indifference. One way is to subscribe to an interpretation of “bodily life” that reduces it to an acceptable level of indifference to the person long before his dying. That—if anyone can believe it today, or if it is not a false account of human nature—was the way taken by Plato in his idealized account of the death of Socrates. (It should be remembered that we know not whether Socrates’ hands trembled as he yet bravely drank the hemlock, no more than we know how Isaac experienced dying when “fullness of years” came upon him. Secondary accounts of these matters are fairly untrustworthy.) Plato’s dialogue The Phaedo may not “work” as a proof of the immortality of the soul. Still it decisively raises the question of immortality by its thorough representation of the incommensurability between mental processes and bodily processes. Few philosophers today accept the demonstration of the mind’s power to outlast bodies because the mind itself is not material, or because the mind “plays” the body like a musician the lyre. But most of them are still wrestling with the mind-body problem, and many speak of two separate languages, a language for mental events isomorphic with our language for brain events. That’s rather like saying the same thing as Socrates (Plato) while claiming to have gone beyond him (Soren Kierkegaard).

I cite The Phaedo for another purpose:

19Augustine, City of God, Book I, Chapter XIII.
20Ibid., Book XIII, Chapter VI.
21Ibid., Book XIII, Chapter VIII.
22Ibid., Book XIII, Chapter XIX.
to manifest one way to render death incomparably welcomed. Those who most have mature manhood in exercise—the lovers of wisdom—have desired death and dying all their life long, in the sense that they seek “in every sort of way to dis sever the soul from the communion of the body”; “thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble her— neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure—when she takes leave of the body. . . .” That life is best and has nothing to fear that has “the habit of the soul

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henever these two escapes are simultaneously rejected—if the “bodily life” is neither an ornament nor a drag but a part of man’s very nature; and if the “personal life” of an individual in his unique life-span is accorded unrepeatable, noninterchangeable value—then it is that Death the Enemy again comes into view. Conquered or Unconquerable. . . . I suggest that it is better to have the indignity of death on our hands and in our outlooks than to “dignify” it in either of these two possible ways. Then we ought to be much more circumspect in speaking of death with dignity, and hesitant to—I almost said—thrust that upon the dying!

Gathering and collecting herself into herself from all sides out of the body.” (Feminists, note the pronouns.)

Granted, Socrates’ insight is valid concerning the self’s transcendence, when he says: “I am inclined to think that these muscles and bones of mine would have gone off long ago to Megara and Boeotia—by the dog, they would, if they had been moved only by their own idea of what was best. . . .” Still Crito had a point, when he feared that the impending dread event had more to do with “the same Socrates who has been talking and conducting the argument” than Socrates is represented to have believed. To fear the loss of Socrates, Crito had not to fancy, as Socrates charged, “that I am the other Socrates whom he will soon see, a dead body.” Crito had only to apprehend, however faintly, that there is not an entire otherness between those two Socrates now, in this living being; that there was unity between, let us say, Socrates the conductor of arguments and Socrates the gesticulator or the man who stretched himself because his muscles and bones grew weary from confinement.

The other way to reduce the dreadful visage of death is to subscribe to a philosophy of “human life” that reduces the stature, the worth, and the irreplaceable uniqueness of the individual person (long before his dying) to a level of acceptable transiency or interchangeability. True, modern culture is going this way. But there have been other and better ways of stipulating that the image of death across the human countenance is no shadow. One was that of Aristotelian philosophy. According to its form-matter distinction, reason, the formal principle, is definitive of essential humanity. That is universal, eternal as logic. Matter, however, is the individuating factor. So when a man who bears a particular name dies, only the individuation disintegrates—to provide matter for other forms. Humanity goes on in other instances. Anything unique or precious about mankind is not individual. There are parallels to this outlook in Eastern religions and philosophies, in which the individual has only transiency, and should seek only that, disappearing in the Fulfillment into the Divine pool.

These then are two ways of denying the dread of death. Whenever these two escapes are simultaneously rejected—i.e., if the “bodily life” is neither an ornament nor a drag but a part of man’s very nature; and if the “personal life” of an individual in his unique life-span is accorded unrepeatable, noninterchangeable value—then it is that
Death the Enemy again comes into view. Conquered or Unconquerable. A true humanism and the dread of death seem to be dependent variables. I suggest that it is better to have the indignity of death on our hands and in our outlooks than to “dignify” it in either of these two possible ways. Then we ought to be much more circumspect in speaking of death with dignity, and hesitant to—I almost said—thrust that upon the dying! Surely, a proper care for them needs not only to know the pain of dying which human agency may hold at bay, but also care needs to acknowledge that there is grief over death which no human agency can alleviate.

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